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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
/ , From: Douglas J 
No. 49, l)~CTOBER TERM, 1970 , • 
.1.rculated: 
State of I_lljnois, Plaintiff,) •n ... - - d. w)' / ~ - - ub ed • / 1 /. I 
v. Motion for Leave to ~'ile '--
:ee,_ Bill of Complaint. 
Wisconsin , et al. 
/EApril -, 1971] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
Plltlntiff moves to file a complaint [!._lle_g_ing defenda_Qts 
are allo"·in raw se,rnge to 6e discharged into Lake 
Mic igan. Accor mg o laintiff some 200 mil110n gal-
lons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other 
waste materials are discharged = into the lake in the 
Milwaukee area alone. Plaintiff alleges that it and its J 
subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges, but 
the State of Wisconsin does not take such actions and 
" ·hen it does it extends the compliance deadlines again 
and again. Plaintiff asks that we,,,abate this public nui-
sance. See Misiouri v. Illinois, 200 U. s"."2 496; Georgia -Y. T ennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230; New Jersey v. 
1Yew York City, 283 U. S. 473. 
The defendants urge us not exercise our jurisdiction 
in this case because of simultaneous administrative pro-
ceedings under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
In late 1967 the Governor of Illinois and the Secretary of 
the Interior initiated an interstate conference concerning 
pollution of Lake Michigan. Participants are the Fed-
eral Government and the States of Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin. The conference was initiated 
pursuant to § 10 (cl) of the Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1160 (cl). 
That section provides that when "pollution of waters .. . 
is endangering the health and welfare of persons in a 
State other than that in which the discharge or dis-
charges ... originate" the Governor or appropriate body 
, I 
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111 the affected State may call for an interstate confer-
ence. After a conference convenes and then reaches its 
conclusion the Secretary may, if he believes effective 
progress tmrnrd abatement is not being made, recommend 
to the appropriate state agency that it take remedial 
action. If no such remedial action is taken the Secretary 
may call a public hearing and appoint a hearing board. 
The hearing board then makes findings and recommend-
ations. The pollutor is then given a reasonable amount 
of time to take appropriate steps. If this is not done, j 
then and only then , the Secretary may ask the Attorney 
General to file suit. 
The problem with ,t,be conference procedure is that a 
conferen;° may never end. -Of the 51 conferences 1 that 
h~e been initiated prior to October 1970 only two have 
terminated. The Potomac River-Washington Metro-
politan Area Conference· had one session in 1957 and had 
its most recent session some 13 years later in :May 1!)70. 
Th e Lake Michigan Conference has had sessions in 1968, 
1069, and 1970. Though it is said that these federal- ; 
s~ate enfo~~em_ent_ conferences have be. en "stepped up" 
srnce 1969,- Ill11101s alleges the conference procedure " as 
far as it affects Lake Michigan is not accomplishing the 
abatement of the public nuisance. 
1 These fi gures :-i re from the F cder::d Water Qu:-ility Administration, 
dated Jul~• 1970, no"· ::i. uni t in t he new Em·ironment:-il Protection 
Agency. The Fedrr:1I Water Qu:-t li ty Adrninistr:ttion is now under 
the jurisdiction of t he Em·ironment:-t l Protect ion Agency. R corg:1 11i-
zation Pbn Ko. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 1.5623 (July 9, 1970). ( 
~ Em·ironmental Quality , First Annu:-il R eport of the Council on 
Emironment:-il Qua lit~·, p. 45 (Aug. 1970). 
" Senator Muskie, main m1thor of the Act has s:-i id : "While abate-
ment conferences haxe dr:1ggcd on in pri,;nte, citizens h.1 ,;e not been 
fully inrnh·ed in the st ruggle;; for wnter qua li t~·. Vigorous actions 
against polluter:; hin-e been commenced but hnxe not been taken to 
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The fact that there is a § 10 conference underway 
should not concern us. As I have noted "[t]here is not 
a " ·ord in federal la,y that bars state action." Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., - U.S.-, - (dissent-
ing opinion ). My views on the exercise of our original 
jurisdiction in cases like this has been set out in my 
Jiryandotte opinion. I need only add one further word. 
Should the Lake Michigan Conference head to,rnrd en-
forcernen t in some ,rny in conflict ,Yith the present com-
plaint, the Special Master obviously would accommodate 
the case to any such action . Thus no friction would 
deYelop. 
There is another reason-and a simpler one-why we 
should grant leave to file. Illinois has no"·here else to 
go. In the Wyandotte case, Ohio liad a remedy in her 
own courts. Illinois is here suing Wisconsin and its 
agencies. Force ,ms historically the remedy which one 
sornreign had against another when diplomacy and the 
other peaceful means for settlement failed. Our Consti-
tution substituted a regime of law for the old historic 
court. Polluters haYe cont inued to foul riYers , bkes, and coastal 
zones ." Cong. Rec. S. 670-671 , February 2, 1971. 
At the l\iuskie hea rin~~ a reason for the inadequacy of the confer-
ence procedure was explained by one witness: 
" .. . there is no right of inspect ion of a polluter's premises. T o-
~et the information that t he enforcement progr:un needs to conduct 
their operations and to make rccomrnf'ndations for abatement which 
haYc to be based on the tcchni ra l fcasibilit~·, eronomic feas ibility of 
rleanup-you haYe to know "·hat the polluter is doing . Of course, 
without any proYision a!IO\ring the GoYernment to sec t hat they 
rea lly rely on the polluter's good will to get him to permit them to 
inspect . And to keep t hat good will , of course, the threat of going· 
to court has to be something that is far in the distant future. 
"The act, in fart, really ~eem~ pretty well designed to starn off that 
court :iction just indefinitely." Water Pollution-1970 (Pt. 5) Hear-
ings, Subcommi ttee on Air and Water Pollution , Committee on Pub-· 
lie ·works, 91st Cong ., 2d Se~s., June 9 and 10, 1970, p. 1669. 
ff . . 1-
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system of force by vesting in this Court jurisdiction over 
{'Ontroversies bet,Yeen States. 
Article III, § 2, was designed to provide a national tri-
bunal for conflicts between one State and another. Ham-
ilon in The Federalist Xo. 80 said that the power to in-
voke our original jurisdiction involved "the peace of the 
Confederacy." And so it does, for instead of one sover-
eign sending its militia against a neighboring sovereign 
to enforce its will. it submits the dispute to adjudication. 
This is the civilized way of making the War System give 
,rny to a regime of the Rule of Law. We should construe 
Article III, § 2, hospitably with that end in view. 
In Wisconsin v. Pel'ican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289, the 
Court stated: 
"The object of vesting in the courts of the United - -----S~jurisdiction of suits by one State against the 
citizens of another was to enable such controversies 
to be determined by a national tribunal, and thereby 
to avoid the partiality or suspicion of partiality, 
which might exist if the plaintiff State ,Yere com-
pelled to resort to the courts of the State of which 
the defendants were citizens. Federalist, No. 80; 
Chief Justice Jay, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 
419, 475; Story on the Constitution §§ 1638, 1682." 
If we do not exercise our original jurisdiction, the State 
of Illinois must resort to the Wisconsin state courts ( un-
less somehow Illinois could obtain personal jurisdiction 
in her own courts). The federal court ·will not be 012..en 
to her. The claim admittedly states no federal cause of 
action. Thus with the exception of our original juris- I 
diction the only way for Illinois to obtain a federal tri-
bunal would e o sue m diversity. Bu sue 1 a suit is 
·- ~
foreclosed for it as long been settled that "a state is ----------- - "- - - ~--not a citizen." And, under the Judiciary Acts of the 
UniteaStates, it is settled that a suit between a State 
al 
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and a citizen or a corporation of another State is not be-
tween citizens of different States; and that the federal 
courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of it, 
unless it arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 
449; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Germania 
Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S. 473; Postal Telegraph 
Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482, 487. See also Arctic-
Maid v. Territory of Alaska, 297 F. 2d 28; Krisel v. Duran, 
386 F. 2d 179. 
If Illinois must resort to Wisconsl in state courts then 
Article III, § 2, is thwarted as to hel . But if we assume, 
arguendo, that Illinois could obtain personal jurisdiction 
in her own courts, the defendant state entities would be 
unable to remove that action to the federal courts in 
Illinois for the same reason Illinois could not bring the 
action in federal district court in the first place: there 
would be no diversity of citizenship. Postal Telegraph 
Cable Co. v. Alabama, supra. 
Thus the purpose of Article III, § 2, would be thwarted_ 
I would grant the motion for leave to file. 
r. .0 L/72--LAH ~.,~ . 
~ f\ 






No. 49 Original 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, et al 
Motion for Leave to File Original Bill of Complaint 
QUESTIONS PRESENTEDs 
(1) Should the Supreme Court exercise its Constitutional 
prerogative to hear this •riginal action? 
(2) Would federal or state law govern the substantive 
issues sought to be presented in original actions such as 
this one? 
FACTS 
The State of Illinois, through its Attorney General, William 
J. Scott, filed, in December, 1970
1
a motion for leave to file 
a bill of complaint against the following entities: (1) City 
of Milwaukee; (2) City of Kenosha; (3) City of Racine; (4) City 
RELEVANT CASESs Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp, 401 U.S. 493 
(1971); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (1971); 






of South Milwaukee; (5) Sewarage Commission of the City of 
Milwaukee; (6) Metropolitan Sewarage Commission of the County 
of Milwaukee . The crux of plaintiff's complaint is that the 
named entities are responsible for the dumping of sewarage 
~to Lake Michigan north of Illinois, and that currents .. .. 
carry the refuse southward into the territorial wames of 
Illinois . There, plaintiff alleges, it constitutes a threat 
to the health, safety, and welfare of the inhabitants of the 
State. Furthermore , it interferes with the rightful use of 
the Lake for recreational, manufacturing, agricultural, and 
drinking pur~nses. 
Five of the six local entities filed briefs in opposition 
to plaintiff's bill of complaint. All five agree that this 
Court has original jurisdiction, both Constitutionally (Art • "---, ____ _.::.. __ _:.. ___ _ 
III, section 2) and statutorily (28 U.S.C. § 1251), but they -
urge the Court to decline to exercise that authority. They 
all rely on this Court's statements that the exercise of orig-
inal jurisdiction is not mandatory but discretionary. They 
each point to the fact that administrative proceedings are 
presently pending which are endeavoring to solve the pollution 
problems of Lake Michigan . It is argued that Illinois should 
be relegated to that remedy. Illinois filed a respone to 
the oppositional briefs, claiming that the administrative 
alternative was ineffective. 
Subsequent to the above mentioned filings, this Court 
issued a question to the parties. That question asked, "Would 
federal or state law govern the substantive issues sought to 
be presented in original actions such as this one?" On thtf 
question Illinois has responded, as well as one of the named 





is my speculation that both the question of jurisdiction and 
applicable law will be considered at this time. 
DISCUSSION 
(1) Question #1--Jurisdiction 
Art III , section 2 states in pertinent part: 
"The judicial Power shall extend .•. to controversies 
between two oF more States;--between a State and Citi-
zens of another State •.•• 
"In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls , and those in which a State shall 
be a party, the supreme Court shall have o:ir.iginal 
jurisdiction." 
This Constitutional source of original jurisdiction 
has been restated and given definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1251: 
h,:.ve 
"(a) The Supreme Court shal1,.
4
original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between two or 
more States; •.• -----(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not ex-
clusive jurisdiction of: •.• (3) All actions or pro-
ceedings by a State against the citizens of another State 
II . . . . 
· For purposes of analysis--in a case of this sort~-it is 
important first to understand the basis for the State's 
suit. Under Article III , two possibilit'es are apparent: the 
~ 
Court has original jurisdiction over suits between states and 
suits between a state and citizens of another state. Congress 
has decided, within its powers to regulate the jurisdiction 
of lower federal courts, to leave the Supreme Court as the 
exclusive federal forum in suits between states , but to 
allow suits between a state and citizens of another state 








Illinois claims that this is a suit between two States--
Illinois and Wisconsin. Although Wisconsin is not named as 
a party, Illinois claims that the municipalities sued have 
been delegated authority by the State to carry out functions 
within the State's prerogative. The Illinois Bill of Com-
1 · d h S · ~ h · · · +hei,c, paint oes not name t e tate, nor is t ere any intimation~ 
that the municipalities are being sued as the agents of the 
State. Indeed, in its short section on jurisdiction, Illi-
nois does not cite the precise language on which it relies 
in either the Constitution or in the statute. (See p.4 of 
Motion) A more particilarized citation of jurisdictional 
authority would have made clear the basis. None of the 
responding municipalities made a point of questioning which 
leg of Artcile IIIfhe State relied on. Even after Illinois 
~l-r kply hi-,'c:.f J 
made clearAthat it was treating the municipalities as agents 
of the State, the single response on the 2d question did not 
challenge that approach. 
This is, I think , a permissible basis for original juris-
diction. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), the 
State of Missouri filed an original action against a Chicago-
based sanitation district on the theory that it was an agency 
of the State of Illinois. Before the case was reached on the 
merits, the defendants filed a demurrur which was denied 
by the Court. 180 U.S. 208 , 242 (1901). There the Court 
agreed that the sanitation district was "the State" for 
jurisdictional purposes. 
At the same time , the Court has also held that a muni-





290 U.S. 179, 187 (1933). Therefore, it would be possible, 
on the basis of prevailing precedent, for this Court to hold 
that jurisdiction is found under both the state-v-state clause 
and the state-v-citizen-of-a-state clause. This distinction 
makes, or may make, some difference for purposes of deciding 
whether this Court should exercise its admittedly existant 
jurisdictional. 
Last Term, this Court decided a landmark case styled, 
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp, 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (8-1; 
per, Harlan, J.). In that case, the State of Ohio asked 
leave to file an original action against three corporations, 
two American and one Canadian, which were allegedly dumping 
mercury into Lake Erie. The Court noted that, while the 
existence of jurisdiction could not be questioned, the Court 
had the discretionary power not to exercise it. After con-
sidering a number of factors, the Court determined not to 
exercise jurisdiction in this case. It noted that (1) its 
docket provided insufficient time to take all such cases; (2) 
that it was an ill-suited forum for developing a factual record 
in a complex scientific controversy, (3) that state court 
alternatives existed: and (4) that the problems of mercury 
pollution of Lake Erie were presently the subject of consideration 
by both International and National administrative boards. 
W 1-/.~ de.fe.nd;s.n~ 
The primary contentionin the instant case is that there 
-1 
is an effective and adequate administrative alternative to 
an original action. All of the responding defendants note 
that, pursuant to the Federal Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C. 











requested the Secretary of Interior to convene a planning 
agency to develop a comprehensive pollution control and abate-
ment plan for Lake Michigan . The Secretary agreed and the 
"Lake Michigan Enforcement Conference" was established. Both 
the States of Illinois and wisconsin are participants in that 
agency and are subject to its authority. At the present time 
that conference has been in operation for three years. The 
parties have not made clear precisely what has been done to 
date but it does appear that effluent standards of some des-
cription have been established and that they are being imple-
mented by the Conference. 
Illinois' response is that the Conference is designed to 
have no more punch than it derives from the individual 
participants and that the statute was written merely to 
cooperate with state-based activity to abate pollution. 
The federal statute was not designed to provide the answer 
to pollution problems when one of the participating 
states is reluctant to participate effectively. 
The parties do not stray far from this administrative 
agency as the sole alternative to this Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction. Illinois points out that its state courts 
do not possess jurisdiction over these Wisconsin entities. 
Illinois states that its "long-arm" statute does not reach 
defendants. This, alone, distinguishes this case from Wyandotte 
since in that case Ohio might have sued the private corpor-
ations in Ohio state courts. Illinois also points out that 
r 
even if it had j urisidbtional reach over Wisconsin munici-
.J 
palities, it would not be able to enforce any judgment its 





sought is mandator0 affirmative action rather than a mere 
money judgment. Defendants do not controvert this argument. 
Finally , Illinois also thinks that it is barred from access 
to the lower federal courts. It cites footnote 3 in the Wyan-
._ .... -dotte case, 401 U.S. at 498-99, in which Justice Harlan • intimated that federal question jurisdiction was lacking. 
------I think in so stating Justice Harlan was in error. This 
aspect of the case will be discussed , however, in the next 
section. 
In conclusion, the question whether jurisdiction should 
be exercised is one committed to the sound discretion of this 
Court. In light of the language of the Wyandotte easel)", 
emphasizing the availability of alternatives and the lack of 
either time or expertise in this tribunal, it is likely that 
this Court will decline to assume jurisid~tion. The Federal 
A 
Water Quality Act alternative seems to be deeeply involved 
with the pollution problem ; if its efforts are impermissibly 
slow, Illinois has the right to challenge the agency's in-
activity in district court under the federal A%in.Proc . Act. 
A 
In addition, I believe that this suit could be instituted 
in a federal district court, and to the rationaieunderlying 
that belief, I will now turn . 
(2) Question# 2--State or federal common law 
The Court asked the parties to comment on the question 
whether this Court was to apply state or federal law in the 
resolution of this suit, if it should exercise its juris-





apply. The response filed by one of the defendants accepts 
the basic premise that federal law applies but goes on to 
assert that the federal law has been deemed by Congress to 
be state law, 
Before the Wyandotte case, the Court had consistently 
held (or, more precisely, assumed) that federal common law -------governed disputes between states or citizens of other states 
within the original jurisidiction of this Court. In Wyandotte, 
however, Justice Harlan stated, in footnote three, that: 
"Nor would federal question jurisid'ction exist under 
.f 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as it appears from the present 
record, an action such as this, if otherwise cogni-
zable in federal district court, would have to be adjud-
icated under state law. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (UB8)." 
If Justice Harlan is correct this ends the discussion. 
I think, however, that his footnote was in error. Of course, 
the Erie doctrine has, in the main, done away with the old 
notion that there existed a federal common law applied in 
diversity cases. There is language in Erie which would seem 
to dispose of this case favorably to Harlan's view. Indeed, 
Justice Brandeis stated rather flatly that there was no 
general federal common law. However, on the same day that 
Erie came down, the Court also handed down Hinderlider v. La 
Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938--this opinion, too, was written 
by Justice Brandeis), Although that was not an original case, 
the Court noted that in interstate water disputes the states 
"could obviously have (sought determination) by a suit in this 
.________ __ -----·-------- - ---- - --Court, as was done in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906)" 
--· ---· 





went to great lengths to point out that there exists a 
federal interstate common law to govern disputes between 
states. 206 U.S. at 95-98. Rightly, he points out that 
when the laws of two states are incompatible, the case may 
not be resolved by application of the law of one or the other. 
The core principle, constituting this federal common law, is 
that water "must be equitably apportioned between the two." 
304 U.S. at 101. Many other cases might be cited which 
have applied this notion of a federal common law in interstate 
disputes of this nature. See, e.g. , New Jersey v. New York, 
283 U.S . 336, 342-43 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 
496 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
230 (1907) (not a water dispute; rather, an air pollution case). 
a,-,.,t 
TI1is notion that interstate dispute$, where a State sues 
' 
citizens of another state, call~for application of federal 
common law, was persuasively held recently in Texas v. Pankey. 
441 F.2d 236 (CA 10 1971). In this case the State of Texas 
filed a suit in the USDC D New Mexico against 8 New Mexican 
ranchers seeking to enjoin them from using a pesticide 
which was causing the pollution of the Canadian River in 
Texas. The DC dismissed for want of jurisdiction finding 
that this suit was not cognizable under federal question 
jurisdiction. The CA 10 reversed. First , it noted that 
disputes of this nature might be brought in either the 
Supreme Court or in a federal district court (if the latter 
has jurisdiction under "federal question" jurisdiction). To -establish federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 133l(a), the claim must "arise under the Constitution, laws, ___. 






find that there exists a federal common law to govern 
interstate disputes. The court found that, by entering the 
Union, the Statei's cannot be held to have sacraficed the ...., 
+-ic;.,. 
right to protect ~ territory against "ecological impair-
1-/, (: ;J-
men t" by acts committed outside li14IS borders. Finally, not 
only is federal common law found to be the source of the DC's 
jurisdiction under section 133l(a), but the law to be applied 
in resolving the dispute is found to be the same federal 
common law, 
"Federal common law and not the varying common law 
of the individual States is, we think, entitled and 
necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in 
uniform standard with the environmental rights of the 
State against improper impairment by sources outside 
its domain •.•• " 
The Tenth Circuit's decision is persuasive. It finds 
support in Charles Alan Wright's treatise of Federal Courts: 
"In deciding suits between states-.-and apparently in 
all other cases to which a state is a party, though the 
matter is not entirely settled--the Court applies 
'federal common law.' (citing Hinderlider) The source 
of such law, and its precise content, have never been 
clearly specified. Sitting, as it were, as an inter-
national, as well as a domestic tribunal, the Court 
draws on federal law, as the exigencies of the case may 
demand. (citing Kansas v. Colorado) Wfuile the munici-
pal law relating to like questions between individuals 
is taken into account, it is not deemed to have con-
trolling effect. In such cases ... the Court is free 
to decide questions of local law for itself if need be." 
The same conclusion is reached in a recent law review 
article, Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate 





12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691, 702-15 (1970). This article traces 
the development of federal interstate common law and 
argues that its ~xistence is still secure despite Erie v. 
Tompkins. In the history of the Constitutional Convention 
the authors find indications that the federal courts were, from 
the outset , entrusted with the duty to resolve disputes 
between the quasi-sovereign states. Prior to 1875 , when 
Congress conferred jurisdiction in lower federal courts to 
resolve questions arising under the laws of the United States , 
the Supreme Court was the sole forum for interstate disputes 
where a state was a party . The need for federal jurisdiction 
was called for by the delegates to assure that the federation 
could fairly and effectively deal with interstate conflicts. 
The federal tribunal was viewed as almost an international 
arbitrator of d• sputes which the independent states could 
not resolve peacefully on their own . Madison stated that 
federal jurisdiction was neces sary to preserve "national 
peace and harmony . " Hamilton noted that federal power 
"rests on the plain proposition that the peace of the whole 
ought not to be left at tre disposal of a part . " Federalist 
Papers No . 80 . This purpose is quite different than the reason 
for having federal courts t o handle diversity cases between 
private parties . The original motivation for that jumis-
t 
diction was to provide a _forum irt.ihich local prejudice 
would not prevail . Application of state law to the latter 
appears sensibler its application to interstate disputes , 
however , seems antithetical to the purposes of having a 









I think it is relatively clear that federal common law -
must be applied in any case taken by this Court under its 
original jurisidction power--irrespective whether the case 
is viewed as one between two states, or as one between Illi-
nois and citizens of Wisconsin. What that controlling law 
might be is not necessary to a decision at this stage. As 
Wright points out, nothing prohibits a court from looking to 
local law for guidance. More especially, I would think 
that the Court would look for guidance to Congress's Federal 
Water Quality Control Act for principles to aid in resolution 
of such disputes. 
If I were writing the opinion for the court in this 
case, I would hold (1) that the Supreme Court has jurisdi~ction; 
'--
(2) that, at bottom, this is a di;pute between Illinois and 
~ 
municipalities (i.e., citizens) of Wisconsin; (3) that 
-
the t,_ederal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
this dispute under section 133l(a); (4) that the adminis-
trative alternative provides another alternative for the 
State of Illinois; (5) that, in view of this Court's backlog 
and inexpertness (citing Wyandotte) , and in view of the 
existence of alternative forums more suited to the reso-
lution of this dispute, this Court exercises its prerogative 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction; (6) if this Court were 
to hear the case it would apply federal interstate common 
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~ 
Today we have received four responses to the question 
posed by the Court whether the dispute in each case would 
be resolved by state or federal law. 
Two responses hav.e been received from the defendants 
in the Illinois case . The Cities of Racine and Kenosha 
agree with Illinois that federal interstate common law 
should apply to this dispute . They assert , of course , that 
what that law may be in fact depends upon which of the avail-
able laws suggests itself to the Court : state law, federal 
law, or interna tional law. The City of Milwaukee dis-
agrees and contends that the case will be governed by state 
law under the doctrine of Erie v . Tompkins . 
Two responses have also been received in the Vermont 
case. Both defendants agree that insofar as the suit against 






common law . But , insofa~ as the case against Int ' l Paper is 
concerned , state law of nuisance will control . 
It is interesting to note the framework of analysis 
from which the parties and I are reviewing this question. 
My analysis rejects the dic tum in Ohio v . Wyandotte Chemical 
as erroroneous ; but I accept Charlie Wright ' s view as well 
as the CA l0 ' s recent holding in Texas v. Pankey; I also 
apply and rely on the Hinderlider case , decided the same 
day as Erie v . Tompkins. The parties who adopt a state law 
rationale , embrace Justice Harlan ' s language from Wyandotte 
they reject the holding in Texas v . Pankey as error; and they 
admit that Wright must h~ve been wrong on this issue ; finally , 
they seek to distinguish the clear implication in Hinderlider 
that interstate common law governs interstate disputes. 
I am still persuaded that my prior view is the sounder 
alternative . The defendants must explain why a distinction 
is to drawn between suits between two states and suits to which 
a state is a party against a cittizen in another state . The 
policy reasons for treating them the same are made clear in 
the Pankey opinion. It should be remembered that my view of 
the applicability of federal common law may provide a way out 
of the thicket created by original actions against citizens 
by another state . If federal law governs then , a fortior i 
federal question jurisidction exists . All such cases could 
then be tried in federal DC , a more appropriate forum for 
redress of this sort of grievance . 
In short , these filings have shown me nothing to c ause 
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Tentative Impressions* 
My tentative conclusions are as follow: 
1. This Court does have jurisdiction (a suit between a state 
and citizens of another state), but not exclusive jurisdiction. This 
assumes - as I do - that suing municipalities is not the same as suing 
the state, and Illinois elected not to sue the state of Wisconsin. 
2. Municipalities have been held to be "citizens of the state" 
Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179, 187. Thus, this is a dispute 
between Illinois and citizens of Wisconsin. Federal district courts 
should have concurrent jurisdiction over such a dispute under § 133l(a). 
This assumes, as I believe to be correct, that federal common law 
should apply, which would result in a "federal question" conferring 
jurisdiction. 
3. For all of the reasons stated in Wyandotte, this Court is 
not in a position to deal with an extremely complex litigation such as 
this. Therefore, even though we have jurisdiction, we should decline 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memos. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
.. 
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to exercise it. This would leave the parties with remedies in both the 
federal courts and state courts. In addition, there is the federal 
administrative proceedings - for whatever it may be worth. 
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State of Illinois 
v. I On Motion for Leave to File 
City of Milwaukee, Wis- Bill of Complaint. 
consin, et al. 
[March - , 1972] 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opuuon of the 
Court. 
This is a motion by Illinois to file a complaint under 
our original jurisdiction against four cities of Wisconsin, 
the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and 
the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County 
of Milwaukee. The cause of action alleged is pollution 
by the defendants of Lake Michigan, a body of inter-
state water. According to plaintiff, some 200 million 
gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other 
w·aste materials are discharged daily into the lake in 
the Milwuakee area alone. Plaintiff alleges that it and 
its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges, 
but that the defendants do not take such actions. Plain-
tiff asks that we abate this public nuisance. 
I 
Article III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: "In 
all Cases .. . in which a State shall be a party, the Su-
preme Court shall have original jurisdiction." Congress 
has provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1) that "The 
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive juris-
diction of: All controversies between two or more 
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It has long been this Court's philosophy that "our 
original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly." Utah 
v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95. We construe 28 
U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1), as we do Art. III,§ 2, cl. 2, to honor 
our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only 
in appropriate cases. And the question of what is ap-
propriate concerns of course the seriousness and dignity 
of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the 
availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction 
over the named parties, ,vhere the issues tendered may be 
litigated, and \\·here appropriate relief may be had. We 
incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so 
that our increasing duties "·ith the appellate docket will 
not suffer. Washington v. General lvf otors Corp., post, 
Illinois presses its request for leave to file saying that 
the agencies named as defendants are instrumentalities of 
Wisconsin and therefore that this is a suit agaim.t Wis-
consin which could not be brought in any other forum. 
Under our decisions there is no doubt that the actions 
of public entities might, under appropriate pleadings, be 
attributed to a State so as to warrant a joinder of the State· 
as party defendant. 
In Missouri Y. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, Missouri invoked 
our original jurisdiction by an action against the State of 
Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of Chicago,. 
seeking an injunction to restrain the discharge of raw 
sewage into the Mississippi River. On a demurrer to the 
motion for leave to file a complaint, Illinois argued that 
the Sanitary District \\·as the proper defendant and that 
Illinois should not have been made a party. That was. 
rejected: 
"The contention . . . seems to be that, because the 
matters complained of in the bill proceed and will 
continue to proceed from the acts of the Sanitary Dis-
trict of Chicago, a corporation of the State of Illinois, 
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it therefore follo,Ys that the State, as such, is not 
interested in the question , and is improperly made a 
party. 
"'We are unable to see the force of this suggestion. 
The bill does not allege that the Sanitary District is 
acting ,,·ithout or in excess of la,yful authority. The 
averrnent and the conceded facts are that the cor-
poration is an agency of the State to do the very 
things ,Yhich, according to the theory of the com-
plainant's case, " ·ill result in the mischief to be ap-
prehended. It is state action and its results that are 
complained of,-thus distinguishing this case from 
that of Louisiana v. Texas [176 U. S. 1], "·here the 
acts sought to be restrained ,Yere alleged to be those 
of officers or functionaries proceeding in a ,nongful 
and malevolent misapplication of the quarantine 
la,Ys of Texas. The Sanitary District of Chicago is 
not a private corporation, formed for purposes of 
private gain. but a public corporation, \Yhose exist-
ence and operation are ·wholly within the control 
of the State. 
"The object of the bill is to subject this public work 
to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the 
method of its construction and maintenance will cre-
ate a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health of 
a neighboring State and its inhabitants. Surely, in 
such a case, the State of Illinois ,rnuld have a right 
to appear and traverse the allegations of the bill. and, 
having such a right, might properly be made a party 
defendant." 180 U. S., at 242. 
In New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, the State 
of New York brought an original action against the State 
of New Jersey and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commis-
sioners, seeking an injunction against the discharge of 
sewage in the Upper New York Bay. The question was 
whether the actions of the sewage agency could be at-
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tributed to New Jersey so as to make that State responsi-
ble for them. The Court said: 
"Also. for the purpose of shovYing the responsibility 
of the State of New Jersey for the proposed action 
of the defendant, the Passaic Valley Sewerage Com-
missioners, the bill sets out, with much detail, the 
acts of the legislature of that State authorizing and 
directing such action on their part. 
"Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments 
of the bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant 
sewerage commissioners constitute such a statutory, 
corporate agency of the State that their action , actual 
or intended, must be treated as that of the State 
itself, and ,Ye shall so regard it." 256 U. S., at 302. 
The most recent case is New Jersey v. New York, 345 
U. S. 369. The action was originally brought by the 
State of New Jersey against the City and State of New 
York for injunctive relief against the diversion of waters 
from Delaware River tributaries lying within New York 
State. Pennsylvania was subsequently allowed to inter-
vene. The question presented by this decision was the 
right of the City of Philadelphia also to intervene in the 
proceedings as a party plaintiff. The issues raised were 
broad: 
"All of the present parties to the litigation have 
formally opposed the motion to intervene on grounds 
( 1) that the intervention would permit a suit against 
a state by a citizen of another state in contravention 
of the Eleventh Amendment; (2) that the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has the exclusive right to 
represent the interest of Philadelphia as parens pa-
triae; and (3) that intervention should be denied, 
in any event, as a matter of sound discretion." 345 
U. S., at 372. 
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We denied the City of Philadelphia's motion to intervene, 
sayrng: 
"The City of Philadelphia represents only a part 
of the citizens of Pennsylvania who reside in the 
watershed area of the Delaware River and its trib--
utaries and depend upon those waters. If we under-
took to evaluate all the separate interests within 
Pennsylvania, we could, in effect, be drawn into an 
intramural dispute over the distribution of water 
within the Commonwealth .... 
"Our original jurisdiction should not be thus ex-
panded to the dimensions of ordinary class actions. 
An intervenor whose state is already a party should 
have the burden of showing some compelling interest 
in his own right, apart from his interest in a class 
with all other citizens and creatures of the state, 
which interest is not properly represented by the 
state." 345 U. S., at 373. 
We added: 
"The presence of New York City in this litigation 
is urged as a reason for permitting Philadelphia to . 
intervene. But the argument misconstrues New 
York City's position in the case. New York City 
was not admitted into this litigation as a matter of 
discretion at her request. She was forcibly joined 
as a defendant to the original action since she was 
the authorized agent for the execution of the sover-
eign policy which threatened injury to the citizens 
of New Jersey. Because of this position as a de-
fendant, subordinate to the parent state as primary 
defendant, New York City's position in the case 
raises no problems under the Eleventh Amendment." · 
345 U. S., at 374-375. 
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We conclude that while under appropriate pleadings, 
Wisconsin could be joined as a defendant in the present 
controversy, it is not mandatory that it be made one. 
It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of 
citizenship, political subdivisions are citizens of their re-
spective States.1 Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179; 
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 \Vall. 118, 122. If a political 
subdivision is a citizen for diversity purposes, then it 
would make no jurisdictional difference whether it was 
the plaintiff or defendant in such an action. That being· 
the case, a political subdivision in one State would be 
able to bring an action founded upon diversity jurisdic-
tion against a political subdivision of another State. 
We therefore conclude that the term "States" as used in 
28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1) should not be read to include 
their political subdivisions. That, of course, does not 
mean that political subdivisions of a State may not be· 
sued under the head of our original jurisdiction, for 28-
U.S. C. § 1251 (b) (3) provides that "The Supreme Court 
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . 
All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens 
of another State . . . ." 
If the named public entities of Wisconsin may, how-
ever, be sued by Illinois in a federal district court, our 
original jurisdiction is not mandatory. 
It is to that aspect of the case that ,Ye now turn. 
II 
28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) provides that "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
1 It i~ equally ,w ll settled that a suit between a State and a citizen 
of another State is not a sui t bchYern cit izen~ of diffcrrnt Stites 
for the purposes of di,·ersit~- of cit izenship jurisdiction. Postat 
Telegraph Cable Co. '"· Alabama. 155 U.S. 482, 487. 
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value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States." 
The considerable interests involved in the purity of 
interstate ,rnters would seem to put beyond question the 
jurisdictional amount provided in§ 1331 (a) . See Glen-
wood Light & Water Co. v . .J.vfutual Light, Heat & 
Power Co., 239 U. S. 121; .J.l!lississippi & Missouri R. v. 
Ward, 2 Black 485, 492; Ronzio T. Denver & R. G. W.R ., 
116 F . 2d 604, 606; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 
117-119 (2d ed . 1970); Kote, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369. 
The question is "·hether pollution of interstate or navi-
gable waters creates actions arising under the "laws" of 
the United States "·ithin the meaning of § 1331 (a). 
We hold that it does; and we also hold that § 1331 (a) 
includes suits brought by a State. 
MR. J-csTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the four members 
of this Court in Romero v. International Terminal Op-
era.ting Co., 358 U. S. 354, 393, who reached the issue, 
concluded that "la,rn," within the meaning of§ 1331 (a) , 
embraced claims founded on federal common law: 
"The contention cannot be accepted that since peti-
tioner's rights a.re judicially defined, they are not 
created by 'the la,Ts ... of the United States' 
,Yithin the meaning of § 1331 . . . . In another 
context, that of state law, this Court has recog-
nized that the statutory " ·ord 'laws' includes court 
decisions. The converse situation is presented here 
in that federal courts have an extensive responsi-
bility of fashioning rules of substantive law .... 
These rules are as fully 'lavrn' of the United States 
as if they had been enacted by Congress." (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
Lower courts have reached the same conclusion. 
8 
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Judge Harvey M. Johnsen in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F_ 
2d 236, 240, stated the controlling principle: 
"As the field of federal common la,Y has been 
given necessary expansion into matters of federal 
concern and relationship ( where no applicable fed-
eral statute exists. as there does not here), the eco-
logical rights of a State in the improper impairment 
of them from sources outside the State's om1 terri-
tory, nov. ,rnuld and should, ,ve think, be held to be 
a matter having basis and standard in federal com-
mon law and so directly constituting a question 
arising under the laws of the United States." 
Chief Judge Lumbard, speaking for the panel in Ivy 
Broadcasting Co. Y. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F. 2d 
486, 492, expressed the same view as follows: 
"We believe that a cause of action similarly 'arises 
under' federal law if the dispositive issues stated 
in the complaint require the application of federal 
common la,v . . . . The word 'laws' in § 1331 
should be construed to include laws created by fed-
eral judicial decisions as well as by congressional 
legislation. The rationale of the 1875 grant of fed-
eral question jurisdiction-to insure the availability 
of a forum designed to minimize the danger of 
hostility toward, and specially suited to the vindi-
cation of, federally created rights-is as applicable 
to judicially created rights as to rights created by 
statute." (Citations omitted.) 
We see no reason not to give "laws" its natural mean-
ing, see Raniero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 
supra, at 393 n. 5 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and there-
fore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims 
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a 
statutory origin . 
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As respects the power of a State to bring an action 
under § 1331 (a), Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 470-
472, is controlling. There Kansas had sued a num-
ber of corporations in its o,vn courts and, since federal. 
rights were involved, the defendants had the cases re-
moved to the federal court. Kansas resisted saying that 
the federal court lacked jurisdiction because of Art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution which gives this Court 
"original jurisdiction" in "all cases ... in which a State 
shall be a party." The Court held that, where a State is; 
suing parties who are not other States, the original 
jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive (Id., at 470) 
and that those suits "may now be brought in or removed 
to the Circuit Courts [now the District Courts] without 
regard to the character of the parties." Ibid. We ad-
here to that ruling. 
III 
Congress has enacted numerous laws touching inter-
state waters. In 1899 it established some surveillance by 
the Corps of Engineers over industrial pollution, not 
including sewage, Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 
1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, a grant of power which we 
construed in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362· 
U. S. 482, and in United States v. Standard Oil Co ., 384 
U. S. 224. 
The 1899 Act has been reinforced and broadened by a 
complex of laws recently enacted. The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1151, tightens con-
trol over discharges into navigable waters so as not to -
lower applicable water quality standards. By the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321, Congress "authorizes and directs" that "the pol-
icies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in this Act" and that "all agencies. 
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of the Federal Government shall . .. identify and develop 
methods and procedures ... v;hich will insure that pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities and values 
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-mak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations." 
Congress has evinced increasing concern " ·ith the quality 
of the aquatic environment as it affects the conservation 
and safeguarding of fish and wildlife resources. See, e. g., 
Fish and Wild Life Act of 1956, 16 U. S. C. § 742a; the 
Migratory Marine Game Fish Act, 16 U. S. C. § 760c; 
and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U. S. C. 
§ 661. 
Buttressed by these new and expanding policies, the 
Corps of Engineers has issued new Rules and Regula-
tions governing permits for discharges or deposits into• 
navigable waters. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act in § 1 (b) 
declares that it is federal policy "to recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the 
States in preventing and controlling ,Yater pollution." 
But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not state, law 
that in the end controls the pollution of interstate or 
navigable ,rnters." While the States are given time to 
establish water quality standards. § 10 ( c) ( 1), if a State 
fails to do so the federal administrator 3 promulgates 
one. § 10 (c) (2). Section 10 (a) makes pollution of 
interstate or navigable waters subject "to abatement" 
,vhen it "endangers the health or "·elf are of any persons." 
"The contrary indiention in Ohio v. lrya.ndotte Chemicals Corp., 
401 U. S. 493, 498. n. 3, was bnsecl on the preoccupation of that 
litigation with publir nui~:rnre under Ohio law, not the fed eral com-
mon law ,Yhich "·e now hold is ample ba~is for fecler,11 jmisdirtion 
under 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (a). 
3 The powers granted the Secretary of the Interior under the-
Federal '\Vater Quality Art were assigned by the President to the 
Administrator of the Em·ironmeutal Protection Agency pmsuant to 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15623. 
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The abatement that is authorized follows a long, drawn-
out procedure unnecessary to relate here. It uses the 
conference procedure, hoping for amicable settlements. 
But if none is reached , the federal administrator may re-
quest the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of 
the -United States for abatement of the pollution . 
~ 10 (g ) . 
The remedy sought by Illinois is not ,Yithin the precise 
scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the reme-
dies \Yhich Congress provides are not necessarily the only 
federal remedies available. "It is not uncommon for 
federal courts to fashion fed eral la,Y \\·here federal rights 
are concerned." 1'e:rtile Work ers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U. S. 448, 457. \Yh en ,rn deal with air or ,rnter in their 
ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common 
law,4 as T exas Y. Pankey , 441 F. 2d 236, recently held. 
4 While the Yarious federal em ·.ironmental protect ion statutes will 
not necessa ril)· mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, 
t he? ma)· prO\·ide useful guidelines in fashioning ~uch rules of de-
cision. ·what we sa id in ,mo ther connection in T extile Workers v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 r. S. 4-h'l. 456-457 . i::; relewnt here : 
"The que~ tion then is. wh:1t is t he substant ive .law to be applied 
in sui ts brought undrr § 301 (a) ? We conclude that the substanti,·e 
law t o apply in suits under§ 301 (n) i~ federal law. which t he courts 
must fa shion from the polic)· of our nntioml labor laws. The Labor 
Management Rehtions Act expre::;sb· furnishes some snbstanti,·e law. 
It points ou t wha t the par tir~ mn)· or may not do in certain situ-
ations. Other problems will lie in the pcnumbrn of express statutory 
mnndates . Some will b rk express statutory sanction but will be 
soh·ed by looking at t he poli cy of t he legislation nnd fashioning a 
remedy that will effectuate that poli r)' . The range of judicial in-
Yentirnness will be detc-rmined b~- the na ture of the problem. F ed-
eral interpreta tion of t he federal law \\·ill goYern, not state law. 
But state law, if compntible wi th t he purpose of § 301 , may be re-
sorted to in order to find t he rule that \\·ill best effectuate t he federal 
policy. Any state bw applied , howC\·er, will be absorbed as fcdernl 
law and will not be an independent source of p1-iYate rights." (Ci-
t at ions omit ted.) See also Woods &- Heed, The Supreme Court and 
Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyando tte 
Case, 12 Ariz . L . Rev. 691 , 713-714 ; K ote, 56 Va. L. Rev. 458 . 
• 
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The application of federal common law to abate a 
public nuisance in interstate or navigable ,rnters is not 
inconsistent "·ith the Water Pollution Control Act. 
Congress provided in § 10 (b) of that Act that, save as 
a court may decree otherwise in an enforcement actionr 
"State and interstate action to abate pollution of inter-
state and navigable waters shall be encouraged and 
shall not . . . be displaced by federal enforcen,en t 
action." 
The leading air case is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U. S. 230, "·here Georgia filed an original suit 
in this Court against a Tennessee company whose noxious 
gases were causing a wholesale destruction of forests, 
orchards, and crops in Georgia. The Court said: 
"The caution with which demands of this sort, 
on the part of a State, for relief from injuries anal-
ogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in 
M-issouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521. But it 
is plain that some such demands must be recognized, 
if the grounds alleged are proved. When the States 
by their union made the forcible abatement of outside 
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby 
agree to submit to whatever might be done. They 
did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable 
demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-
sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a 
suit in this court. M-issouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 
208, 241." 206 U. S., at 237. 
The nature of the nuisance was described as follows: 
"It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of 
a sovereign that the air over its territory should not 
be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, 
that the forests on its mountains, be they better or 
worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have 
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threat-
ened by the act of persons beyond its control, that 
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the crops and orchards on its hills should not be 
endangered from the same source. If any such de-
mand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding 
the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were 
between private parties, and the doubt whether for 
the injuries which they might be suffering to their· 
property they should not be left to an action at law.'~ 
Id., at 238. 
Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the-
same theme. Rights in interstate streams, like questions 
of boundaries, "have been recognized as presenting fed-
eral questions." " Hinderlider Y. LaPlata Co., 304 U. S. 
92, 110. The question of apportionment of interstate-
waters is a question of "federal common law" upon which 
state statutes or decisions are not conclusive.6 Ibid. 
In speaking of the problem of apportioning the waters 
of an interstate stream, the Court said in Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98, that "through these successive· 
5 Thus, it is not only the character of t he parties which requires us 
to apply federal law. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 205· 
U. S. 230, 237; cf. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 269; 
The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton). As Mr. Justice Harlan in--
dicated for the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U. S. 398, 421-427, where there is an overriding federal interest in 
the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the cont ro,·crsy 
touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal com--
rnon law. See also Clearfield Trust Co . v. United States, 318 U. S. 
363 ; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal D eposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 
447 ; C. Wright , The Law of Federal Courts 249 (2d ed. 1970); 
·woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and In terstate Environmental" 
Quality : Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. R e\'. 691, 
703-713 ; Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183. Certainly these same demands 
for applying federal law are present in the pollut ion of a body of 
water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four Stat es . 
6 Those who maintain that state la11· governs oYerlook the fact 
that the Hinderlider case was authored by l\1r. Justice Brandeis who-
also wrote for the Court in Erie R . Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,._ 
t he t 11·0 cases being decided the same day. 
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disputes and decisions this Court is practically building 
up "·hat may not improperly be called interstate com-
mon law." And Eee Texas v. A-ew Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 
( escheat of intangible personal property), Texas v. 
Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 405 (suit by bill in the nature 
of interpleader to determine the true domicile of a 
decedent as the basis of death taxes). 
Equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate 
stream has often been made under the head of our orig-
inal jurisdiction. Nebraska v. ·wyoming, 325 U. S. 589; 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 469; cf. Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 373 U. S. 546, 562. The applicable federal common 
la,Y depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case. 
"Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. 
But physical and climatic conditions, the consump-
tive use of ,rnter in the several sections of the river, 
the character and rate of return flows, the extent of 
established uses, the availability of storage water, 
the practical effect of ,rnsteful uEes on downstream 
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared 
to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation 
is imposed on the former-these are all relevant 
factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an ex-
haustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the 
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjust-
ment of interests which must be made." 325 U. S., 
at 618. 
When it comes to water pollution this Court has spoken 
in terms of "a public nuisance." 7 New York Y. 1Vew Jer-· 
7 In North Dakota Y. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374, the Court 
said: 
" ... where one St:1te, by a change in its method of draining water 
from lands within its border, increases the flo,Y into an interstate 
stream, so that its natur:11 capacity is greatly exceeded and tho 
water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the latter State-
has such an interest as quasi-:;O\·ereign in the comfort, health and 
prosperity of its farm owners that resort may be had to this Court 
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sey, 256 U. S. 296, 313; Kew Jersey v. 1V ew York City, 
283 U. S. 473, 481, 482. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 
496, 520- 521, the Court said, "It may be imagined that 
a nuisance might be created by a State upon a navigable 
riYer like the Danube, which \Yould amount to a casus 
belli for a State lo,-rnr down, unless removed. If such a 
nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi the 
controversy ·would be resolved by the more peaceful means 
of a suit in this Court." 
It may happen that ne"· federal laws and ne,,· federal 
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal 
common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, 
federal courts will be empowered to appraiee the equities 
of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by 
\Yater pollution. ·while federal law governs.~ consider-
ation of state standards may be relevant. Cf. Connecti-
cut Y. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670. Thus a State 
with high water quality standards may well ask that its 
strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled 
to lo,rnr itself to the more degrading standards of a 
neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these 
for relief. It is the cre:1tion of a public nuis:rnce of simple type for 
\Yhich a Stat e ma>· proper]>· ask an injunction." 
8 "Federal common hw nnd not the Yflr>·ing common law of the 
indi,·idual Sta tes is, we think. entitled and necessa ry to be recog-
nized as a basis for de:, ling- in uniform standard with the em·iron-
mental rights of a State :,g-ainst improprr impairment b>' source.::; 
outsides its domain. The more would this seem to be impcratirn in 
the present cm of growing- concern on t he part of a St:1tc about its 
ecologica 1 conditions and impnirrnents of them. In the outside 
sources of such impairment , more conflicting dispute,, increasing 
assertions :rnd proliferat ing contention.::; would seem to be inevitable. 
Until the field has been made the subject of cornprchen,i,·e legislation 
or authorized adrnini::; tratiYe stand:n cb , on!>· a federal common law 
basis ran proYide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as 
alleged federal rights. And the logic and practicality of regarding 
such claims as being entitled to be asserted within the federal-
question jurisdiction of § 1331 (a) would seem to be self-evident." 
Texas Y. Pankey, supra, 241-242. 
" 
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will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of 
the chancellor will largely govern. 
We deny, without prejudice, the motion for leave to--
file. While this original suit normally might be the ap-
propriate vehicle for resolving this controversy, we exer-
cise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate· 
District Court 9 ,..,.hose powers are adequate to resolve the 
issues. 
So ordered. 
9 The rule of decision being federal, the "action ... may be 
brought only in the judicial dist rict where all defendants reside, or 
in which the claim a rose," 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b) , thereby giving· 
flexibility to the choice of venue. See also 28 U. S. C. § 1407. 
Whatever ma)· be a municipality's sovereign immunity in act ions 
for damages, see Vnn Alstyne . Gowrnmental Tort Liability: A D ec-
ade of Change. 1966 Ill. L . F. 919, 944-948; Note, 4 Suffolk L. Rev. 
832 (1969), actions seeking injunctive relief stand on a different 
footing. The cases are virtually unnnimous in holding that munici-
palities are subject to injunctions to abate nuisances . See cases 
collected in 17 l\IcQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 49.51 et seq . (3d rm·. ed. 1968). Sec also Wis. Stat . Ann. § 5996 
(6) (b) (1957) as respects the suability of metropolit an sewage 
comm1ss10ns. 
While the kind of equitable relief to be accorded lies in the 
discretion of the chancellor (City of Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay 
Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334), a State that causes a public nuisance is 
suable in this Court and any of its public entities is suable in a 
federal district court having jurisdiction: 
" ... it is generally held that a municipality, like a private in-
dividual, may be enjoined from maintaining a nuisance. Thus in 
a proper case a municipal corporation will be restrained by in-
junction from creating a nuisance on private property, as by the 
discharge of sewage or poisonous gases thereon, or, in some jurisdic-
tions, by the obstruction of drainage of waters, or by discharging 
sewage or filth in to a stream an d polluting the ,rnter to the damage 
of lower ripa rian owners, or b)· dumping ga rbage or refuse, or by 
other acb . Likewise, a municipality may be enj oined from creating 
or operating a nui6a nce, whether t he municipality io acting in a 
governmental or proprietary capacity, impairing property rights. 
And, if a nuisan ce is esta blished causing irreparable injury for which 
there is no adequate remedy at law it may be enjoined irrespective 
of the resulting damage or injury in the municipality." 17 McQuil- -
lin, supra, § 49.55. 
/ 
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Please join me in your opinion as modified by 
your March 29 memorandum. 
I will be adding about eight lines that will be 
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Nos. 49 & 50 Originals 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 
Vermont v. New York 
"'-'- S:ec../ ll/ 
H-~~ 
This memo is addressed to the narrow question whether 
a federal district court would have jurisdiction over a 
suit between a State and a citizen of another State. My 
conclusion is that such jurisdiction does exist • 
• 
Section 1331 of Title 28 confers jurisdiction on federal 
district courts for all cases arising under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States. If it is accepted that inter-
state controversies such as the ones in the instant cases must 
be reviewed under standards derived from "federal interstate 
common law," then the only question is whether "laws" may --be read to include judicial as well as statutory law. The 
first question, I think, is clearly that federal common law 
does apply. The second question is more difficult. 
As I have indicated in the former memos, Justice Harlan's 





does not exist, citing Erie v Tompkins. This question was 
never argued or briefed when the case was presented and the 
footnote seems to be an ill-advised bit of dictum. The 
10th Circuit in Texas v. Pankey has held to the contrary 
on precisely this question. Charles Alan Wright has come to 
the same view. 
Further research has led me to discover three other 
- ---
sources broadly supportive of a conclusion that federal 
-==== 
common law is "law" within section 1331. 
(1) In 1959, the Court decided ~omero v. Int'l Terminal 
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Justice Frankfurter 
wrote the opinion for a 5-4 Court. The case involved a 
Spanish seaman who was injured while aboard a Spanish ship 
flying a Spanish flag. The ship was harbored in NY waters 
when the injury occur~d. 
~ 
The seaman sued the owner of the Ship, 
a Spanish Corp., in the USDC SD NY under US federal maritime 
law (the common law of admiralty). The DC dismissed the 
suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that section 1331 
"did not confer jurisdiction dm the federal law courts over 
claims rooted in federal maritime law." Id. at 358. Justice 
Frankfurter held that the DC was correct on the ground that 
maritime cases were restricted to the DC's admiralty juris-
diction. The fact that the Court held that such cases were 
restricted to maritime jurisdiction merely meant that plain--tiffs could not get jury trials since the same judges in the 
. "---- --_~ --- ~ 
federal serve both as maritime and regular trial judges. The 
Court d:d not reach the question~e instant case . 
A 
Justice Brennan, however, wrote a lengthy and thorough 






reachi~g the question whether federal common law constituted 
federal law under 1331. He concluded: 
"Since petitioner's causes of action for unseaworthi-
ness and for maintenance and cure are created by federal 
law, his case arises under "the laws ••• of the United 
States 'within the meaning of section 1331, for it is 
clear that a suit arises under the law that creates the 
cause of action." Id. at 393. 
He states at several points that "court decisions" fall within 
the rubric "laws" as well as do statutory laws. "These rules 
~ - --.:. 
are/fully "laws" of the United States as if they had been 
enacted by Congress." Id. 
(2) More recently, the Second Circuit (per Judge Lum-
bard; unanimous panel) held that section 1331 conferred 
jurisdicttmon in a suit against the Telephone Company based 
on common law negligence and breach of contract. Judge 
Lumbard reviewed the question and found that "the word 'laws' 
in section 1331 should be construed to include laws created 
by federal judicial decisions as well as by congressional 
legislation." The ct found persuasive Justice Brennan's 
disent in Romero. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. AT & T, 391 F.2d 
486 (1968). 
(3) The ALI, in its recent Study of the Division of 
Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts (1969) came 
to the same conclusion as did Justice Brennan and Judge 
Lumbard.: 
"Although the Supreme Court has never decided the question 
••• it seems probable that the Court would hold that 
the 'laws' referred to in the statute are not confined to 
Acts of Congress but include also such 'federal common 





"The Reporters believe that the result just suggested 
as probable ought to be reached. The considerations that 
make a federal district court an appropriate forum for 
cases arising directly under the Constitution or an 
Act of Congress appear to them to apply with equal force 
to cases that are governed by federal decisional 
doctrine that owes its authority ultimately but more 
remotely to those~ sources." Pp 180-81. 
This last sentence seems to be of particular importance. 
The federal interstate common law gmverning interstate pollution 
disputes derives, at bottom, from the essential nature of 
our Constitutional form of Government. The States, when they 
entered the Union, surrendered their independent sovereignty 
to the extent that they ?ecame committed to peaceful resolution 
... 
of their inter-state disputes. The federal judicial system 
was designed to perform this special arbitrating function. 
It seems to me that this notion lies at the heart of our 
federal system. 
CONCLUSION: 
I see no impediment to holding that both of these cases 
should not be taken under the Court's discretionary original 
jurisdiction. An opinion should be written suggesting that 
insofar as the suit is against citizens in other states (either 
corporations or municipalities) the suits may be brought in 
federal district~ section 1331. Such an opinion would 
' 
be a significant ruling since the Court has never squarely 
so held and since it requires overturning Justice Harlan's 
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[March -, 1972] 
MR. JusncE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This is a motion by Illinois to file a complaint under 
our original jurisdiction against four cities of Wisconsin, 
the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and 
the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County 
of Milwaukee. The cause of action alleged is pollution 
by the defendants of Lake Michigan, a body of inter-
state water. According to plaintiff, some 200 million 
gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other 
waste materials are discharged daily into the lake in 
the Milwuakee area alone. Plaintiff alleges that it and 
its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges, 
but that the defendants do not take such actions. Plain-
tiff asks that we abate this public nuisance. 
I 
Article III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: "In 
all Cases ... in which a State shall be a party, the Su-
preme Court shall have original jurisdiction." Congress 
has provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1) that "The 
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive juris-
diction of: All controversies between two or more 
States .... " 
2 
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It has long been this Court's philosophy that "our 
original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly." Utah 
v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95. We construe 28 
U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1), as we do Art. III,§ 2, cl. 2, to honor 
our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only 
in appropriate cases. And the question of what is ap-
propriate concerns of course the seriousness and dignity 
of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the 
availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction 
over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be 
litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had. We 
incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so 
that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will 
not suffer. Washington v. General Motors Corp., ante, 
Illinois presses its request for leave to file saying that 
the agencies named as defendants are instrumentalities of 
Wisconsin and therefore that this is a suit agairn~t Wis-
consin which could not be brought in any other forum. 
Under our decisions there is no doubt that the actions. 
of public entities might, under appropriate pleadings, be 
attributed to a State so as to warrant a joinder of the State 
as party defendant. 
In Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, Missouri invoked 
our original jurisdiction by an action against the State of 
Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of Chicago, 
seeking an injunction to restrain the discharge of raw 
sewage into the Mississippi River. On a demurrer to the 
motion for leave to file a complaint, Illinois argued that 
the Sanitary District was the proper defendant and that 
Illinois should not haYe been made a party. That " ·as. 
rejected: 
"The contention ... seems to be that, because the 
matters complained of in the bill proceed and \\"ill 
continue to proceed from the acts of the Sanitary Dis-
trict of Chicago, a corporation of the State of Illinois,. 
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it therefore follows that the Sta.te, as such, is not 
interested in the question, and is improperly made a 
party. 
"'Ve are unable to see the force of this suggestion. 
The bill does not allege that the Sanitary District is 
acting v,:ithout or in excess of lawful authority. The 
averment and the conceded facts are that the cor-
poration is an agency of the State to do the very 
things which, according to the theory of the com-
plainant's case, will result in the mischief to be ap-
prehended . It is state action and its results that are 
complained of,-thus distinguishing this case from 
that of Louisiana v. Texas [176 U.S. 1], "·here the 
acts sought to be restrained \\·ere alleged to be those 
of officers or functionaries proceeding in a wrongful 
and malevolent misapplication of the quarantine 
laws of Texas. The Sanitary District of Chicago is 
not a private corporation, formed for purposes of 
private gain, but a public corporation, whose exist-
ence and operation are wholly within the control 
of the State. 
"The object of the bill is to subject this public work 
to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the 
method of its construction and maintenance ,vill cre-
ate a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health of 
a neighboring State and its inhabitants. Surely, in 
such a case, the State of Illinois "·ould have a right 
to appear and traverse the allegations of the bill. and, 
having such a right, might properly be made a party 
defendant." 180 U. S., at 242. 
In New York v. N ew Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, the State 
of New York brought an original action against the State 
of New Jersey and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commis-
sioners, seeking an injunction against the discharge of 
sewage in the Upper New York Bay. The question was 
whether the actions of the sewage agency could be at-
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tributed to New Jersey so as to make that State responsi-
ble for them. The Court said: 
"Also. for the purpose of showing the responsibility 
of the State of New Jersey for the proposed action 
of the defendant, the Passaic Valley Sewerage Com-
missioners, the bill sets out, with much detail, the 
acts of the legislature of that State authorizing and 
directing such action on their part. 
"Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments 
of the bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant 
sewerage commissioners constitute such a statutory, 
corporate agency of the State that their action, actual 
or intended, must be treated as that of the State 
itself, and ,rn shall so regard it." 256 U. S., at 302. 
The most recent case is New Jersey Y. 1Vew Yark, 345 
U. S. 369. The action was originally brought by the 
State of New Jersey against the City and State of New 
York for injunctive relief against the diversion of waters 
from Delaware River tributaries lying within New York 
State. Pennsylvania was subsequently allowed to inter-
vene. The question presented by this decision ,ms the 
right of the City of Philadelphia also to intervene in the 
proceedings as a party plaintiff. The issues raised were 
broad: 
"All of the present parties to the litigation have 
formally opposed the motion to intervene on grounds 
(1) that the intervention would permit a suit against 
a state by a citizen of another state in contravention 
of the Eleventh Amendment; (2) that the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has the exclusive right to-
represent the interest of Philadelphia as parens pa-
triae; and (3) that intervention should be denied, 
in any event, as a matter of sound discretion." 345-
U. S., at 372. 
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We denied the City of Philadelphia's motion to intervene,. 
saying: 
"The City of Philadelphia represents only a part 
of the citizens of Pennsylvania who reside in the· 
watershed area of the Dela,vare River and its trib-
utaries and depend upon those waters. If we under-
took to evaluate all the separate interests within 
Pennsylvania, we could, in effect, be drawn into an 
intramural dispute over the distribution of water 
within the Commonwealth ... . 
"Our original jurisdiction should not be thus ex--
panded to the dimensions of ordinary class actions. 
An intervenor whose state is already a party should' 
have the burden of showing some compelling interest 
in his own right, apart from his interest in a class 
with all other citizens and creatures of the state, 
which interest is not properly represented by the 
state." 345 U. S., at 373. 
We added: 
"The presence of New York City in this litigation 
is urged as a reason for permitting Philadelphia to 
intervene. But the argument misconstrues New 
York City's position in the case. New York City 
was not admitted into this litigation as a matter of 
discretion at her request. She was forcibly joined 
as a defendant to the original action since she was 
the authorized agent for the execution of the sover-
eign policy which threatened injury to the citizens. 
of New Jersey. Because of this position as a de-
fendant, subordinate to the parent state as primary 
defendant, New York City's position in the case-
raises no problems under the Eleventh Amendment."· 
345 U. S., at 374-375. 
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We conclude that while under appropriate pleadings, 
Wisconsin could be joined as a. defendant in the present 
controversy, it is not mandatory that it be made one. 
It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of 
citizenship, political subdivisions are citizens of their re-
spective States.1 Bullard v. City of C'isco, 290 U. S. 179; 
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 122. If a political 
subdivision is a citizen for diversity purposes, then it 
would make no jurisdictional difference whether it was 
the plaintiff or defendant in such an action. That being 
the case, a political subdivision in one State would be 
able to bring an action founded upon diversity jurisdic-
tion against a political subdivision of another State. 
We therefore conclude that the term "States" as used in 
28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(l) should not be read to include 
their political subdivisions. That, of course, does not 
mean that political subdivisions of a State may not be 
sued under the head of our original jurisdiction, for 28 
U.S. C. § 1251 (b) (3) provides that "The Supreme Court 
shall haYe original but not exclusive jurisdiction of ... 
All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens 
of another State . . . ." 
If the named public entities of Wisconsin may, how-
ever, be sued by Illinois in a federal district court, our 
original jurisdiction is not mandatory. 
It is to that aspect of the case that we nmY turn. 
II 
28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) provides that "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
wherein the matter in controYersy exceeds the sum or 
1 It is equally well settled that a suit bet\\·ecn n State and n citizen 
of anothn Stnte is not a suit between citizens of different States 
for the purposes of di,·ersity of citizenship jurisdiction. Postal 
T elegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487. 
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value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States." 
The considerable interests involved in the purity of 
interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the 
jurisdictional amount provided in § 1331 (a) . See Glen-
wood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & 
Power Co., 239 U. S. 121; Mississippi & Missouri R. v. 
Ward, 2 Black 485, 492; Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W.R., 
116 F. 2d 604,606; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 
117-119 (2d ed . 1970); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369. 
The question is whether pollution of interstate or navi-
gable ,Ya.ters creates actions arising under the "laws" of 
the United States within the meaning of § 1331 (a). 
We hold that it does; and we also hold that § 1331 (a) 
includes suits brought by a State. 
MR. JuSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the four members 
of this Court in Romero v. International Terminal Op-
era.ting Co., 358 U. S. 354, 393, who reached the issue, 
concluded that "laws," within the meaning of § 1331 (a), 
embraced claims founded on federal common law: 
"The contention cannot be accepted that since peti-
tioner's rights are judicially defined, they are not 
created by 'the laws ... of the United States' 
within the meaning of § 1331 . . . . In another 
context, that of state law, this Court has recog-
nized that the statutory word 'la,rn' includes court 
decisions. The converse situation is presented here 
in that federal courts have an extensive responsi-
bility of fashioning rules of substantive law . .. . 
These rules are as fully 'laws' of the United States 
as if they had been enacted by Congress." (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
Lo,rnr courts have reached the same conclusion. E . g.~ 
T exas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 240-242; Ivy Broad-
8 
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casting Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
391 F . 2d 486, 492. Chief Judge Lumbard, speaking for 
the panel in Ivy Broadcasting, supra, at 492, expressed 
the rationale for this result: 
"½~ e believe that a cause of action similarly 'arises 
under' federal law if the dispositive issues stated 
in the complaint require the application of federal 
common law . . . . The word 'laws' in § 1331 
should be construed to include laws created by fed-
eral judicial decisions as ,vell as by congressional 
legislation . The rationale of the 1875 grant of fed-
eral question jurisdiction-to insure the availability 
of a forum designed to minimize the danger of 
hostility toward, and specially suited to the vindi-
cation of, federally created rights-is as applicable 
to judicially created rights as to rights created by 
statute." (Citations omitted.) 
vVe see no reason not to give "laws" its natural mean-
ing, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 
supra, at 393 n. 5. (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and there-
fore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims 
founded upon federal common la.w as well as those of a 
statutory origin. 
As respects the power of a State to bring an action 
under § 1331 (a), Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 470-
472, is controlling. There Kansas had sued a num-
ber of corporations in its ovm courts and, since federal 
rights were involved, the defendants had the cases re-
moved to the federal court. Kansas resisted saying that 
the federal court lacked jurisdiction because of Art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution which gives this Court 
"original jurisdiction" in "all cases . .. in which a State 
shall be a party." The Court held that, where a State is 
suing parties who are not other States, the the original 
jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive (Id., at 470) 
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and that those suits "may now be brought in or removed 
to the Circuit Courts [now the District Courts] without 
regard to the character of the parties." I bid. We ad-
here to that ruling. 
III 
Congress has enacted numerous laws touching inter-
state waters. In 1899 it established some surveillance by 
the Corps of Engineers over industrial pollution, not 
including se,rnge, Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 
1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, a grant of power which we 
construed in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 
U. S. 482, and in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 
U. S. 224. 
The 1899 Act has been reinforced and broadened by a 
complex of laws recently enacted. The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1151, tightens con-
trol over discharges into navigable waters so as not to 
lower applicable water quality standards. By the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C_ 
§ 4321, Congress "authorizes and directs" that "the pol-
icies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in this Act" and that "all agencies 
of the Federal Government shall . .. identify and develop 
methods and procedures ... which will insure that pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities and values 
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-mak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations."· 
Congress has evinced increasing concern with the quality 
of the aquatic environment as it affects the conservation 
and safeguarding of fish and wildlife resources. See, e. g., 
Fish and Wild Life Act of 1956, 16 U. S. C. § 742a; the 
Migratory Marine Game Fish Act, 16 U. S. C. § 760c; 
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Buttressed by these new and expanding policies, the 
Corps of Engineers has issued new Rules and Regula-
tions governing permits for discharges or deposits into 
navigable waters. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act in § 1 (b) 
declares that it is federal policy "to recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the 
States in preventing and controlling water pollution." 
But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not state, law 
that in the end controls the pollution of interstate or 
navigable wa.ters. 2 While the States are given time to 
establish ,rnter quality standards, § 10 ( c) (1) , if a State 
fails to do so the federal administrator a promulgates 
one. § 10 (c)(2). Section 10 (a) makes pollution of 
interstate or navigable waters subject "to abatement" 
when it "endangers the health or ,rnlfare of any persons." 
The abatement that is authorized follmYs a long, drav;-n-
out procedure unnecessary to relate here. It uses the 
conference procedure, hoping for amicable settlements. 
But if none is reached , the federal administrator may re-
quest the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of 
the United States for abatement of the pollution. 
§ 10 (g ). 
The remedy sought by Illinois is not \\·ithin the precise· 
scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the reme-
dies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only 
federal remedies available. "It is not uncommon for 
federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights 
2 The co nt ra ry indirntion in Ohio '"· Wyandott e Chemirals Corp., 
401 U. S. 493. 498, n. 3 , wns bnsed on the preoccupation of that 
litigntion wi th public m1isn nre under Ohio law, not the federal com--
mon law \Yhich we llO\Y hold is ample bn,is for federal jurisdiction 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a). 
3 The powers granteJ the Serrctnry of the Interior under the 
F ederal Water Quality Act were n,,igncd by the President to t he 
Administrator of the Em·ironmentnl Protection Agency pursuant t(} 
R eorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See 35 F ed. Reg. 15623. 
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are concerned." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Jvlills, 353 
U. S. 448, 457. When we deal with air or water in their 
ambient or interestate aspects, there is a federal common 
la,Y.4 as Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, recently held. 
The application of federal common law to abate a 
public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not 
inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act. 
Congress provided in § 10 (b) of that Act that, save as 
a court may decree otherwise in an enforcement action, 
"State and interstate action to abate pollution of inter-
state and navigable \Yaters shall be encouraged and 
shall not . . . be displaced by federal enforcement 
action." 
The leading air case is Georgia Y. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U. S. 230, "·here Georgia filed an original suit 
4 While the v:trious feder3l environmental protection statutes will 
not necessa rily m:trk the outer bounds of the federal common faw, 
the~, ma~· provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of de-
ri~ion . What we S3 id in 3nother connection in T extile Workers v. 
Lincoln Mills . 353 U. S . 448 , 456-457, is relevent here: 
"The qu e~ tion then is. whnt is the substnnt ive faw to be applied 
in suits brought under§ 301 (a )? We conclude that the substantive 
law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts 
must fashion from the polir~· of our nation:11 labor laws. The Labor 
::\fanagement H.eb tions Act express]~· furnishes some substn ntive law. 
It points out ,vhat the pnrt ies may or may not do in certain situ-
3tions. Other problems " ·ill lie in the penumbra of express statutory 
mand3tes. Some "·ill lark express statutory sanction but will be 
solYed b~· looking at the policy of the legi~la tion nnd fashioning a 
remedy thnt will effectu3te that polir~' - The range of judicial in-
ventiwness "·ill be det ermined by the nnture of the problem. Fed-
eral interpretation of the federal law will govern, not stn te law. 
But st3te bw, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be re-
~orted to in order to find the rule th.1t will be~t effectuate the federal 
policy. Any state law applied, howe,·er, "·ill be absorbed 3s federnl 
lmv and will not be an independent source of private rights." (Ci-
tations omitted. Sec abo \Voocls & R ecd, The Supreme Court and 
Interstnte Em·ironmental Qunlity: Some Notes on the Wyandotte 
Case, 12 Ariz. L. ReY. 691, 713-714; Note, 5G Va. L. R ev. 458. 
49, Orig.-OPINION 
12 ILLINOIS v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE 
in this Court against a Tennessee company ,vhose noxious 
gases were causing a " 'holesale destruction of forests,. 
orchards, and crops in Georgia. The Court said: 
"The caution with which demands of this sort, 
on the part of a State, for relief from injuries anal-
ogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521. But it 
is plain that some such demands must be recognized, 
if the grounds alleged are proved. When the States. 
by their union made the forcible abatement of outside 
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby 
agree to submit to whatever might be done. They 
did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable 
demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-
sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a 
suit in this court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 
208, 241." Id., at 237. 
The nature of the nuisance was described as follows: 
"It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of 
a sovereign that the air over its territory should not 
be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, 
that the forests on its mountains, be they better or 
worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have 
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threat-
ened by the act of persons beyond its control, that 
the crops and orchards on its hills should not be 
endangered from the same source. If any such de-
mand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding 
the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were 
between private parties, and the doubt whether for 
the injuries which they might be suffering to their 
property they should not be left to an action at law." 
Id., at 238. 
Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the 
same theme. Rights in interstate streams, like questions 
of boundaries, "have been recognized as presenting fed-
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eral questions." '· Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U. S. 
92, 110. The question of apportionment of interstate· 
waters is a question of "federal common law" upon which 
state statutes or decisions are not conclusive.a I d., at 110. 
In speaking of the problem of apportioning the ,rnters 
of an interstate stream, the Court said in Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98, that "through these succes~ive 
disputes and decisions this Court is practically building· 
up what may not improperly be called interstate com-
mon law." And see Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 
( escheat of intangible personal property), Texas v. 
Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 405 (suit by bill in the nature 
of interpleader to determine the true domicile of a 
decedent as the basis of death taxes) . 
Equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate-
stream has of ten been made under the head of our orig-
in al jurisdiction. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589; 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 469; Arizona v. California, 
5 Thus, it is not only the character of the parties which requires us 
to apply federal law. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co .. 206 
U. S. 230, 237; cf. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 269; 
The Federa list No. 80 (A. Hamilton). As Mr. Justice Harlan in-
dicated for the Court in B anco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U. S. 398, 421-427, where there is an overriding federa l interest in 
the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controvsery 
touches basic interests of federalism, we haYe fashioned federal com-
mon law. See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 
363; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal D eposit Ins . Corp ., 315 U. S. 
447; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 249 (2d ed. 1970); 
Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental 
Quality: Some Notes on the ·wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. ReY . 691, 
703-713; Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183. Certainly these same demands 
for applying federal law arc present in the pollution of a body of 
water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States . 
6 Those who maintain that state Ltw goHrns o,·erlook the fact 
that the Hinderlider case was authored by Mr. Justice Brandeis who 
also wrote for the Court in Erie R. Co . v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, . 
the two cases being decided the same day. 
14 
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373 U. S. 546, 562. The applicable federal common law 
depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case. 
"Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. 
But physical and climatic conditions, the consump-
tive use of water in the several sections of the river, 
the character and rate of return flows, the extent of 
established uses, the availability of storage "·ater, 
the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream 
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared 
to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation 
is imposed on the former-these are all relevant 
factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an ex-
haustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the 
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjust-
ment of interests which must be made." 325 U. S. , 
at 618. 
When it comes to water pollution this Court has spoken 
in terms of "a public nuisance," 7 New York v. New Jer-
sey, 256 U.S. 296. 313; New Jersey v. New York City, 
283 U. S. 473, 481, 482. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 
496, 520-521 , the Court said, "It may be imagined that 
a nuisance might be created by a State upon a navigable 
river like the Danube, "·hich would amount to a casus 
belli for a State lo,Yer clown, unless removed. If such a 
nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi the 
controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means 
of a suit in this Court." 
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal 
7 In North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374, the Court 
said: 
" . .. where one Sfote, by a change in its method of draining water 
from lands within its border, increases the flow into an interstate 
stre:im , so th:1t its nat ur:1 1 capacity i~ /!reatly exceeded :1 nd the 
water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the latter State 
h:1s such an intere~t as qua,i-so,·ereign in the comfort, hea lth and 
prosperity of its farm owners tlrnt resor t may be h:1d to this Court 
for relief. It is t he creation of a public nuisance of simple t:vpe for 
which a State may properly ask an injunction." 
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regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal 
common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, 
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities 
of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by 
water pollution. While federal law governs,8 consider-
ation of state standards may be relevant. Cf. Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670. Thus a State 
with high water quality standards may well ask that its 
strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled 
to 10\rnr itself to the more degrading standards of a 
neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these 
will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of 
the chancellor will largely govern. 
We deny, without prejudice, the motion for leave to 
file. While this original suit normally might be the ap-
propriate vehicle for resolving this controversy, we exer-
cise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate 
District Court u whose powers are adequate to resolve the 
issues. 
So ordered. 
8 "Federal common law and not the Yar~,ing common law of the 
indiYidunl Stntes is, we think, entitled and necessa ry to be recog-
nized as a basis for de:1 ling in uniform stnndard with the em·iron-
mental rights of a State against improprr impairment by sources 
outsides its domnin . The more would this seem to be imperative in 
the present era of growing concern on the part of a State about its 
ecological conditions and impnirments of them. In the outside 
sources of such impairment, more conflicting disputes, increasing 
assertions and proliferating contentions would seem to be ineyitable. 
Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensi,·e legislation 
or authorized administrafo·e standards, only a federal common law 
basis can proYide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as 
11 1leged federal rights. And the logic and practicality of rega rding 
such cbims as being entitled to be asserted within the frdcrnl-
question jurisdiction of § 1331 (a ) would seem to be self-eYident." 
T exas \'. Pankey, supra, 241-242. 
9 The rule of decision being federal, the "action . . . may be 
brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or 
in which the claim arose," 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), thereby giving 
fl exibility to the choice of venue. See also 28 U. S. C. § 1407. 
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On Motion for Leave to File 
Bill of Complaint. 
[March -, 1972] 
MR. J usTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This is a motion by Vermont for leave to file a com-
plaint invoking our original jurisdiction against New 
York and against International Paper Company, a New 
York corporation doing business in New York, and seek-
ing to abate a public nuisance caused by a long-term 
discharge of wastes and sewage into Lake Champlain by 
way of Ticonderoga Creek. 
It is alleged that New York is the owner of the bed 
of Lake Champlain to the deepest point in the channel 
,vhich marks the New York-Vermont boundary. See 
Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65, 89. 
It is alleged that the discharge of wastes and sewage 
iuto the lake by International Paper has continued for 
approximately 45 years and has created a sludge bed on 
the bottom of the lake covering approximately 300 acres 
and containing 802,000 cubic feet of wood chips, cinders, 
and organic material in state of anaerobic (septic) decay, 
the sludge bed being up to 12 feet in depth. It is alleged 
that the pollution has rendered Vermont waters in the 
lake unfit for drinking, fishing, swimming, boating, and 
all other reasonable uses. It is also alleged that the 
presence of the sludge bed unlawfully alters the boundary 
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The liability of International Paper is based on the 
apparently uncontested fact that it is the polluter. The 
liability of N e,Y York is predicated on the fact that 
New York owns the western bed of Lake Champlain to 
the deepest channel which marks its boundary with 
Vermont and as the landowner has allowed a public 
nuisance of a notorious character to flourish on its prop-
erty to the injury, wrong, and discomfiture of its neighbor, 
Vermont. 
Damages are asked; and an abatement of the public 
nuisance requested. The relief sought includes removal 
of the sludge bed. 
New York in its motion that leave to file be denied, 
asserts that the cause of action alleged is not fit for our 
original jurisdiction. It points out that since 1965 it has 
been active in trying to solve the problem, that the solu-
tion in-rnlves technological answers not fit for adversary 
proceedings, that the requisite end result will be achieved 
not by litigation but by cooperative action of the two 
States. Vermont, hmYever, points out that it has pur-
sued a remedy under the Federal Water Pollution Act, 
33 U. S. C. § 1151, following the conference procedure 
outlined in § 10 of that Act \\-ith a request to federal 
authorities that the nuisance be abated. But that remedy 
apparently was not forthcoming. 
Vermont has in the Federal District Court an alterna-
tive forum against International Paper Company. For 
the reasons stated in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, de-
cided this day, there is jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (a) to seek relief there under the head of federal 
common law that governs interstate nuisances. In keep-
ing with our view that our original jurisdiction should 
be exercised sparingly, we deny Vermont leave to file 
here against International Paper Company. 
Vermont is, however, in a different relationship with 
New York. New York may not be sued by Verrnont 
,: 
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in any other forum. 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) provides that 
this Court "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction 
of: ( 1) all controversies between two or more States." 
This does not mean that any claim by one State against 
another must be entertained here no matter how color-
able. Cases such as New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 
296; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, which were dis-
missed on the merits, indicate that the original action 
must in no sense be colorable. Our difficulty at this 
juncture is that on their face, Vermont's allegations can-
not be called such. New York apparently concedes that 
it is the owner of the land under Lake Champlain on 
which the bed of sludge was deposited . The deposit was 
not sudden or capricious; it took place over a period of 
40 odd years and its existence was notorious, so notorious 
that beginning at least in 1965 New York became con-
cerned and started to take steps to resolve the contro-
versy. vVe have at present only fragmentary accounts 
of the condition and are in no position to judge the 
equities. We accordingly have decided to defer action 
on the motion of New York to deny leave to file until 
Vermont resolves its dispute with International Paper 
Company or until as a result of other procedures the 
parties advise us what aspect or aspects of the case 
against New York remain unresolved. 
The motion for leave to file against International Paper 
Company, is denied•x- without prejudice and our decision 
on the motion for leave to file against New York is 
reserved. 
So ordered. 
•:The motion of the Monroe County Conservation Council to 
interrnne was denied by our order March 20, 1972. 





Re: Original Cases, Nos. 49 & 50 
Judge: 
Attached are Justice Douglas's opinions in the two 
original cases (I have also attached FYI a copy of his cir-
culation in the related General Motors Original case, which 
you are out of). The two cases--Illinois and Vermont--follow 
closely the line I suggested in my bench memo and supplemental 
memo on these cases. The opinion holds (the major opinion is 
the Illinois one): 
(1) The Court has jurisdiction--not exclusive--over this 
dispute between Illinois and citizens of Wisconsin. The 
State of Wisconsin could have been named as a party but it 
is not a necessary party. 
(2) The Court exercises its original jurisdiction 
sparingly and will not exercise it in this case in view of 
the fact that the parties may bring their case in federal 
district court under section 1331--federal question juris-
diction. He cites Pankey, Judge Lumbard in Ivy, and Justice 
Brennan in Romero, among others. Justice Harlan's footnote 
in Wyandotte is dis~uished in a footnote. 
(3) The "law" to be applied is federal common law, and 
what precisely that law may be depends on the particular 
controversy. The equity powers of the DC to fashion the law 
are broad. The DC should look to federal legislation, past 
principles of interstate water law, and even state law where 
it may be relevant. 
The Vermont case follows the ruling laid down in the 







this Court's exclusive jurisdiction over suit:Sbetween two 
states. Since Vermont may not sue NY in USDC under federal 
question jurisdiction, this Court cannot refuse to hear the 
case solely on the ground that an adequate alternative 
exists. Instead the Court will defer action on the suit 
against NY until the International Paper dispute is resolved. 
The rationale is that the Vermont-IP battle may resolve the 
entire case and leave no remaining substantial claim against 
the State of NY. The language (P. 3) is not altogether clear, 
but I think in essence Vermont must get all the relief it 
can from IP before it comes back to this Court for assistance 
against NY. 
Nothing in either opinion departs in substance from 
the view of these cases that we discussed. I would therefore 
recommend that you circulate a note indicating that you join 
Justice Douglas's opinions. 
JOIN LAH 
.. 
March 25, 1972 
Re: No. 49 Orig. Illinois v. Milwaukee, et al 
No. 50 Orig. Vermcnt v. New York, et al 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinioos circulated March 20. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
